AFGHANISTAN FOR THE LONG HAUL
by Amir Taheri
New York Post
April 22, 2005

April 22, 2005 -- IN the past few days, Afghan istan's President Hamid Karzai has been the target of attacks in the media in Iran, Pakistan and a number of Arab countries for his demand that the United States forge a long-term defense relationship with his newly liberated nation. Yet Karzai's idea of a strategic alliance with America seems to enjoy massive support in Afghanistan itself.

Karzai first raised the issue in the spring of last year, generating a process of consultation with the country's ethnic, religious and linguistic communities. It soon became clear that, despite reservations from some former leftists, Karzai would encounter little opposition in seeking a long-term U.S. alliance.

Some critics claim Karzai's policy is a break with a two-century-old tradition of Afghan neutrality. But that stance was put to the test in 1979, when the Red Army marched into Kabul to support a puppet Communist regime installed in a coup d'etat two years earlier. The event dealt a blow to the idea of nonalignment in the Afghan consciousness.

The Soviet invasion was followed by two decades of suffering, as Afghanistan became the battleground for a proxy war between the Soviet and American blocs. After the fall of the Soviet empire, Afghanistan was ravaged by another proxy war, this time pitting the Khomeinist regime in Tehran against its Salafist rivals in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

But why a long-term military link with the United States? Because Afghanistan is located in a rough neighborhood where despotic regimes hold sway.

These regimes regard a democratic Afghanistan, as much as a democratic Iraq, as an existential threat. What would Iranians and their Arab neighbors think of their despotic regimes if the Afghans — who have always been dismissed as rustics, if not outright barbarians — are allowed to choose their own government and determine its policies through free elections?

Later this year, Afghanistan and Iraq will hold general elections in which dozens of political parties representing all the shades of the political spectrum will take part. In June's Iranian presidential election, however, only candidates approved by the "Supreme Guide" will be allowed to stand, while all political parties remain banned.

Iran is not alone among Afghanistan's neighbors to fear democratization in that country. Turkmenistan is suffocating under President Safar-Murad Niyazov's medieval personality cult. Uzbekistan is a classic dictatorship built around President Islam Karimov. China is one of the world's last remaining Communist regimes. Tajikistan, where an alliance of neo-Communists and Islamists holds power, may be less repressive but is no more democratic. And Pakistan, where political parties are theoretically allowed while their leaders are exiled, is yet to emerge from its tradition of see-sawing between democracy and military rule.

All these regimes have an interest in undermining the Afghan process of democratization, and will do so via a mixture of political and military pressure.

Pakistan sees Afghanistan as a bridge to Central Asia which provides the geopolitical depth it needs to offset, at least in part, the power of the Indian giant to its east. Because it is home to some 20 million Pushtuns, Pakistan is also playing the ethnic card in Afghanistan. It was partly in the name of pan-Pushtunism that Islamabad created the Taliban monster in 1995 (with financial support from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates).

Iran has always regarded itself as something of a "big brother" for Afghanistan, and, under the Treaty of Paris (1856), claims a droit de regard in Afghan affairs. For the past quarter-century, Tehran has played the Shiite card in Afghanistan, while also arming some of the most radical Sunni elements linked to the Taliban and al Qaeda.

For its part, Uzbekistan, often backed by Turkey, has invested heavily in the ethnic Uzbek community in northern Afghanistan. Tajikistan, backed by Russia, has played a similar game with the ethnic Tajiks in northeastern Afghanistan. India and China have also meddled in Afghan affairs, the first to counter Pakistan, and the second to keep an eye on Russia.

It is clear that none of the regional powers is in a position to protect Afghanistan against predatory neighbors while it builds its democracy and acquires enough military strength and sociopolitical cohesion to defend itself. That task can only be assumed by an extra-regional power. Yet the European Union's natural tendency is to cuddle despots, not to stand up to them. NATO is also out because, plagued by internecine feuds, it is often unable to develop a coherent strategy. That leaves only the United States — hence Karzai's public appeal for a formal alliance.

But why should Americans commit themselves to a remote land with which they have little in common? The answer lies in President Bush's correct understanding that the most effective weapon in winning the war against terrorism is democratization. U.S. national security requires that the world's last remaining despotic regimes, where anti-Americanism provides the core of a sick ideology, be guided — and, when necessary, goaded — into democratization.

The United States has given Iraq and Afghanistan a chance to start democratization. It must remain committed to them for as long as it takes to make that process irreversible. Karzai has the vision, and the courage, to raise the issue. Later this year, we shall see whether Iraq's elected parliament will share his analysis. A positive response from Washington to Karzai's demand could also help the debate in Iraq.

Iranian author Amir Taheri is a member of Benador Associates.

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