Much has been said over the past 12 months about the need for reform and democratisation by Arab Gulf governments. While it is evident that Gulf governments have an aversion to genuine democratic reform, it is far too simplistic to put the blame for political stagnation squarely on them. For behind these governments is a network of interests so powerful and intricately woven that it acts as a resistance lever even in the rare instances where serious political reform is suggested.
For instance, the centuries-old tribal nature of the Gulf societies ensures that authority is by tradition delegated to a tribal chief. Even during elections it is not uncommon to see tribes voting exclusively for their own family members. In the United Arab Emirates, several reform activists were openly condemned, while one government-owned
The religious authorities in the Gulf states are perhaps among the biggest obstacles to reform. Most clerics in the Gulf rely heavily on government support and reciprocate it with fatwas that serve the governments
When in the following month the prospects for demonstrations appeared to be shifting to Saudi Arabia, the kingdom's council of senior clerics issued a fatwa forbidding protests. Often these clerics find themselves in a conundrum and have to carefully package their criticism so as not to offend their generous patrons. In one recent incident, the Egyptian cleric Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who is hosted by the wealthy emirate of Qatar, stated, in reference to Syria, that the time for ruling dynasties in Arab republics was over.
Many businesses in the Gulf operate in an unethical manner; almost all are monopolies that provide substandard services to clients who aren&apo