IN setting a date for the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq the other day, President Obama said, "Every nation and every group must know, whether you wish America good or ill, that the end of the war in Iraq will enable a new era of American leadership and engagement in the Middle East." Indeed, he said, "That era has just begun."

This was a curious statement. Why speak of the war's end, yet not mention whether this has already happened - and if it has, whether it ended in victory for the US and its Iraqi allies? But Obama's "new era" would look quite different depending on who won. It's one thing to build a "new era" based on victory, quite another on the basis of defeat.

Nor did Obama say why he wants a firm timetable for withdrawal. Does he want to create the illusion that he has some strategy of his own - even if no one quite knows what it is?

His wordplay with the term" combat troops" adds to confusion. The 35,000 to 50,000 men and women that he'll keep in Iraq certainly won't flinch from combat when and if needed.

Whatever Obama's calculations, many in the Middle East see his move as a signal that America wishes to minimize its involvement in the region. Few commentators take Obama's "new era of American leadership and engagement" seriously: You don't start a "new era" by going away.

To be credible, leadership and engagement require a number of tangibles. To start with, the power offering that leadership must make it clear what it wants.

From 1936, when President Franklin Roosevelt met King Abdul-Aziz of Saudi Arabia, until the end of the Cold War, it was clear what the US wanted in the Mideast: to preserve the status quo and ensure the unhindered flow of the region's oil to world markets. By the end of the 1960s, Israel's survival had been added to US strategic objectives in the region.

After 9/11, President George Bush developed a strategy aimed at transforming his nation from a supporter of the Middle East status quo to an agent of change. Bush saw the region as the chief source of threat to US national security in the form of terrorism, and argued that only democratization could "drain the swamps that breed the mosquitoes of terror."

The desired democratization was to come in two ways. In Afghanistan and Iraq, two nations that lacked domestic mechanisms for reform, force was used to remove impediments to democratization.

In countries with domestic mechanisms for change, America would use its power and influence to speed up their working. Ruling elites would be pressured to introduce reforms, hold elections and generally broaden the base of their power as first steps toward slow but steady democratization.

That strategy led to significant (if underappreciated) changes in most of the 26 countries of the Greater Middle East. Constitutions were promulgated, elections held, franchises extended to women, opposition parties allowed to field candidates and greater space opened for debate and dissent.

Thus, when Obama took office, the nation had a strategy that aimed at change and democratization. It also had deployed the political, diplomatic and military capabilities required to pursue that strategy. And despite many mistakes made over the past seven years, the results were better than most had expected.

The strategy also strengthened the nation's security: There has been no further terror attack on US soil and no major attack on US interests in the region since 2001. Instead, America has been on the offensive against its many enemies in and around the region.

Now Obama has three options. He can continue the Bush strategy, albeit with modifications; he can revert to the old (and failed) support of the status quo - or he can try to disengage from the Middle East, allowing the region to sail toward the unknown under its own stream.

Obama plainly sees that his public has no enthusiasm for US involvement in the Middle East. Indeed, that lassitude greatly contributed to his victory on Election Day. But now he has the tough task of persuading Americans that the nation must remain involved in Middle Eastern politics.

Thus, the leadership of which Obama speaks must start at home. He must tell the American people what really happened in Iraq. A "new era of leadership" doesn't start simply because the president makes a speech and tinkers with the timetable of troop redeployments. Leadership requires clear objectives, and the means to achieve them.

After 9/11, President George Bush developed a strategy aimed at transforming his nation from a supporter of the Middle East status quo to an agent of change. Bush saw the region as the chief source of threat to US national security in the form of terrorism, and argued that only democratization could "drain the swamps that breed the mosquitoes of terror."

The desired democratization was to come in two ways. In Afghanistan and Iraq, two nations that lacked domestic mechanisms for reform, force was used to remove impediments to democratization.

In countries with domestic mechanisms for change, America would use its power and influence to speed up their working. Ruling elites would be pressured to introduce reforms, hold elections and generally broaden the base of their power as first steps toward slow but steady democratization.

That strategy led to significant (if underappreciated) changes in most of the 26 countries of the Greater Middle East. Constitutions were promulgated, elections held, franchises extended to women, opposition parties allowed to field candidates and greater space opened for debate and dissent.

Thus, when Obama took office, the nation had a strategy that aimed at change and democratization. It also had deployed the political, diplomatic and military capabilities required to pursue that strategy. And despite many mistakes made over the past seven years, the results were better than most had expected.

The strategy also strengthened the nation's security: There has been no further terror attack on US soil and no major attack on US interests in the region since 2001. Instead, America has been on the offensive against its many enemies in and around the region.

Now Obama has three options. He can continue the Bush strategy, albeit with modifications; he can revert to the old (and failed) support of the status quo - or he can try to disengage from the Middle East, allowing the region to sail toward the unknown under its own stream.